-
How I understand "MEV"?
MEV exists because blockspace is scarce and valuable. This might sound abstract, but it's actually quite intuitive once you think about it the right way. Here, in a simplified version, is my mental model for thinking about MEV. continue reading
-
MEV law after Avi Eisenberg's (partial) victory
Avraham Eisenberg—previously found guilty of wire fraud and market manipulation of Mango Markets by a jury—was just acquitted on wire fraud charges. Also, while the judge confirmed Eisenberg engaged in illegal market manipulation, this conviction was vacated for being brought in a wrong jurisdiction (New York instead of Puerto Rico). This decision provides us rare insight into how U.S. courts may approach MEV-related prosecutions. My co-authors and I argued in "Blockchain Transaction Ordering as Market Manipulation" that applying traditional finance assumptions to crypto is a risky business and that intuitions about fairness do not automatically carry over. We also argued that certain forms of MEV—particularly sandwiching—might constitute market manipulation under existing law. Here, I comment on the nuances that the Eisenberg decision introduces for legal analysis of MEV. continue reading
-
Does the EU GDPR make public blockchains illegal?
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has issued draft guidelines on applying the GDPR to blockchain technologies, raising concerns that they could effectively make public blockchains illegal in the EU. The guidelines suggest that blockchain addresses and transaction data can be personal data and that the GDPR's right to erasure might require deleting entire blockchains. I explain the EDPB's position, identify who might be affected (like stablecoin issuers and validators), outline potential consequences, and argue for a more pragmatic interpretation of the GDPR. continue reading
-
DEX self-regulation
While self-regulation for centralized crypto exchanges is a familiar idea, extending this to decentralized exchanges (DEXs) presents unique hurdles. Yuliya Guseva's recent paper proposes a way forward: a central Self-Regulatory Organization (OSRO) that initially focuses on high-level standards and whitelisting compliant platforms, rather than immediate heavy regulation. This approach aims to nudge the fast-evolving DEX space towards greater safety and coordination, but its success likely hinges on a growing market demand for trustworthiness within the crypto world. continue reading
-
Good/bad MEV: arbitrage
First text in my series on "good/bad" MEV—focusing on arbitrage trades. Arbitrage in decentralized finance represents one of the most competitive and fundamental forms of MEV realization. This strategy tends to be viewed as bening, especially in comparison with sandwiching. However, in some contexts, even arbitrage may be problematic. continue reading
- MEV (not only) for lawyers (video)
Good crypto
Thoughts on ethical and legal crypto marketing and trading