1. How I understand "MEV"?
    MEV exists because blockspace is scarce and valuable. This might sound abstract, but it's actually quite intuitive once you think about it the right way. Here, in a simplified version, is my mental model for thinking about MEV. continue reading
    MEV DeFi
  2. MEV law after Avi Eisenberg's (partial) victory
    Avraham Eisenberg—previously found guilty of wire fraud and market manipulation of Mango Markets by a jury—was just acquitted on wire fraud charges. Also, while the judge confirmed Eisenberg engaged in illegal market manipulation, this conviction was vacated for being brought in a wrong jurisdiction (New York instead of Puerto Rico). This decision provides us rare insight into how U.S. courts may approach MEV-related prosecutions. My co-authors and I argued in "Blockchain Transaction Ordering as Market Manipulation" that applying traditional finance assumptions to crypto is a risky business and that intuitions about fairness do not automatically carry over. We also argued that certain forms of MEV—particularly sandwiching—might constitute market manipulation under existing law. Here, I comment on the nuances that the Eisenberg decision introduces for legal analysis of MEV. continue reading
    MEV DeFi
  3. Does the EU GDPR make public blockchains illegal?
    The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has issued draft guidelines on applying the GDPR to blockchain technologies, raising concerns that they could effectively make public blockchains illegal in the EU. The guidelines suggest that blockchain addresses and transaction data can be personal data and that the GDPR's right to erasure might require deleting entire blockchains. I explain the EDPB's position, identify who might be affected (like stablecoin issuers and validators), outline potential consequences, and argue for a more pragmatic interpretation of the GDPR. continue reading
    Public policy Privacy
  4. DEX self-regulation
    While self-regulation for centralized crypto exchanges is a familiar idea, extending this to decentralized exchanges (DEXs) presents unique hurdles. Yuliya Guseva's recent paper proposes a way forward: a central Self-Regulatory Organization (OSRO) that initially focuses on high-level standards and whitelisting compliant platforms, rather than immediate heavy regulation. This approach aims to nudge the fast-evolving DEX space towards greater safety and coordination, but its success likely hinges on a growing market demand for trustworthiness within the crypto world. continue reading
    Public policy DeFi
  5. Good/bad MEV: arbitrage
    First text in my series on "good/bad" MEV—focusing on arbitrage trades. Arbitrage in decentralized finance represents one of the most competitive and fundamental forms of MEV realization. This strategy tends to be viewed as bening, especially in comparison with sandwiching. However, in some contexts, even arbitrage may be problematic. continue reading
    MEV DeFi
  6. Crypto Law Seminar #5 (28 June 2024): “Regulatory Implications of MEV Mitigations”
    Discussing a paper by Yan Ji and James Grimmelmann, the seminar explored the legal implications of MEV (Miner Extractable Value) practices, focusing on distinguishing between beneficial and harmful MEV, regulatory challenges under MiCA, and the evolving norms in DeFi. Key discussions included user expectations, liability standards, and the impact of emerging technologies like MEV-Boost. The need for nuanced regulation to balance innovation and fairness was emphasized, alongside the importance of further research and education in this rapidly evolving field. continue reading
    DeFi MEV Market manipulation

9 more texts in the archive