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Enshrined Proposer-Builder Separation (ePBS) on Ethereum and legally credible neutrality
Enshrined proposer–builder separation (ePBS) scheduled for Ethereum's Glamsterdam upgrade promises to make the blockchain more robust and less reliant on external tools. I'd like to explore whether ePBS will also improve legally credible neutrality for any of the participants in the Ethereum network, like I recently did for the FOCIL proposal. Here, I explain how ePBS strengthens that case for proposers, creates an even cleaner “conduit‑like” role for a new committee, and concentrates discretion (and thus potentially legal attention) at the builder layer. continue reading
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FOCIL on Ethereum and legally credible neutrality
The debate over whether Ethereum's next major upgrade ("Glamsterdam") should include fork‑choice enforced inclusion lists (FOCIL, EIP‑7805) has been framed primarily as an engineering and incentive‑design question. I want to reframe it as a legal‑design question: what does FOCIL do to the distribution of practical discretion among base‑layer actors, and does that improve the case for what I have elsewhere called "legally credible neutrality"? My short answer is yes—mostly. FOCIL converts what is today a fragile, norm‑based non-censorship aspiration into a protocol‑enforced constraint for most validators and proposers, which strengthens the argument that they should be treated in law as neutral infrastructure rather than as editors of user activity. However, at the same time, FOCIL introduces a new locus of discretion in the inclusion‑list committee. continue reading
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Trading on confidential information: the Chastain judgment and its implications for MEV
The Second Circuit's reversal of OpenSea employee Nathaniel Chastain's wire fraud conviction — for trading NFTs before featuring them on the platform — establishes that not all informational advantages constitute property under fraud statutes, particularly when the information lacks commercial value to its holder. This reasoning has implications for MEV strategies like sandwiching: exploiting positional advantages in the mempool may not constitute fraud absent appropriation of genuine property interests. continue reading
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How I understand "MEV"?
MEV exists because blockspace is scarce and valuable. This might sound abstract, but it's actually quite intuitive once you think about it the right way. Here, in a simplified version, is my mental model for thinking about MEV. continue reading
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MEV law after Avi Eisenberg's (partial) victory
Avraham Eisenberg—previously found guilty of wire fraud and market manipulation of Mango Markets by a jury—was just acquitted on wire fraud charges. Also, while the judge confirmed Eisenberg engaged in illegal market manipulation, this conviction was vacated for being brought in a wrong jurisdiction (New York instead of Puerto Rico). This decision provides us rare insight into how U.S. courts may approach MEV-related prosecutions. My co-authors and I argued in "Blockchain Transaction Ordering as Market Manipulation" that applying traditional finance assumptions to crypto is a risky business and that intuitions about fairness do not automatically carry over. We also argued that certain forms of MEV—particularly sandwiching—might constitute market manipulation under existing law. Here, I comment on the nuances that the Eisenberg decision introduces for legal analysis of MEV. continue reading
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Does the EU GDPR make public blockchains illegal?
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has issued draft guidelines on applying the GDPR to blockchain technologies, raising concerns that they could effectively make public blockchains illegal in the EU. The guidelines suggest that blockchain addresses and transaction data can be personal data and that the GDPR's right to erasure might require deleting entire blockchains. I explain the EDPB's position, identify who might be affected (like stablecoin issuers and validators), outline potential consequences, and argue for a more pragmatic interpretation of the GDPR. continue reading